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TRIAL TECHNIQUES-PART II
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following two articles complete a
series on the subject of Civil Trial Techniques in Colorado District
Courts commenced in the October, 1951 issue of Dicta. The authors
previously presented this material in addresses given at Institutes
held in Denver, Grand Junction and Pueblo.

PLAINTIFF'S PROCEDURE IN ESTABLISHING
A PRIMA FACIE CASE
By GODFREY NORDMARK
of the Denver Bar

This article should be prefaced by a short, but pregnant explanation.
While I have prosecuted a number of plaintiff's cases, the
ratio to those defended is about one to fifty. Although my trial
training was received under one of the ablest trial strategists in
the state, it was almost entirely confined to the defense of cases
and, therefore, the following will consist largely of observations
of things which, from the defense table looked good or bad, or
ideas, which to my sorrow and embarrassment were either stillborn, or bore no resemblance in life to the more or less idealist
hopes in which they were conceived.
Suggestions here may seem somewhat academic to many older
and much more experienced practitioners, but if so let me remind
them that this is simply a written version of a talk aimed at members of the Junior Bar. Many of these boys will, by careful,
earnest and sincere preparation of a case, figuratively kick the
teeth down the throat of older and more experienced counsel who
come into court relying upon their gray hair and a poorly remembered brief that they have used in a previous case (and one related with everlasting but boring glory) twenty long Supreme
Court decisions ago!
Assuming that you have decided upon a trial by jury of a
damage case in order that you may squeeze every sympathetically
blinded dollar out of it for the benefit of your client, your jury
examination should have made them individually know you and
your client's honest and sincere purpose of seeing justice done!
Remember that the average jury is just as unpredictable as a
baby's bladder, and that no single verdict is going to make or
break your career.
There are a few answers to some questions which you should
have decided upon before you actually start putting on your case.
Should you let the jury view the premises? This may or may
not be a good thing for your case and your decision must be controlled by the circumstances surrounding it after a careful study
thereof. It is suggested that you carefully examine the situs of
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the premises and in doing so also examine the various approaches
thereto, as these approaches may make a tremendous impression
upon the jury. For example, suppose you are defending a condemnation suit and the route chosen for the jury to travel to the
premises runs through a slum area when it could have passed
through a respectable or even plush district. The disadvantages
and advantages are obvious. Your order for such examination
should not only specify the situs, but the route to be travelled in
reaching it. It should be unnecessary to mention it, but the jury
must be taken out by an officer of the court authorized to so do,
without the presence of any other person, and the court should
order that person not to point out specific things to the jury.
Transportation, of course, must be arranged by the requesting
party. The motion for such viewing may be made at any time,
either at pre-trial conference, or at any propitious time during the
trial, but you yourself should know the decision as to whether
or not it is advisable before the jury is in the box.
SHOULD YOU MOVE TO EXCLUDE WITNESSES?

Surprisingly enough the possibilities of this motion seem to
be unknown to, or overlooked by many plaintiff's counsel. This
motion obviously must be made prior to the calling of the first
witness and it may be made by either side. The granting thereof
is discretionary with the court, but as a practical matter it seldom
is denied. It should be remembered that the motion if granted does
not exclude parties. Here again the advantages and disadvantages
must be carefully weighed.
It seems to be advantageous when the opposing side has a
large number of witnesses and you have only a few, because
witnesses, after having listened to the story told over and over
again, have a tendency to harmonize their testimony and also to
take sides and color their testimony in support of the side which
they are serving. They also become fore-warned of sharp crossexamination and the pitfalls exposed thereby. Sometimes your
own witnesses will pick up small differences of testimony of previous witnesses and blurt out something injurious to your case
that is in violent disagreement with the story told you during your
interviews with them. Last, but by no means least if your opponent has an unwilling witness under subpoena who has been somewhat mollified with the prospect of seeing a dramatic show, but,
as a result of your motion, has to sit for two or three days on a
cold hard bench in the hall thinking about the valuable business he
is missing, his cooperative spirit for your opponent is apt to be a
big fat minus by the time he does get on the stand. Don't forget
here that you, also, might have such a witness on whom you are
depending. It may be disadvantageous to make such a motion when
some of your witnesses, because of their extremely accurate knowledge, may be able to pick up inaccuracies in testimony of opposing witnesses and thus be helpful to you in cross examination.
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Further, sometimes a sharp cross examination of a preceding
witness has a tendency to "cool off" and make more temperate the
testimony of other opposing witnesses who follow. Also, expert
witnesses have a tendency to be more careful in their own testimony on their specialty if they recognize another specialist in the
same field listening to their statements.
To CALL WITNESSES
The order in which witnesses should be called is something
that requires a good deal of study in each individual case and can
very well spell the difference between success and failure. Present
your case in a natural and chronological sequence. Try to present
as your first witness the one who makes the best appearance of
honesty and sincerity, one who has the best memory of events, and
one who is alert and has confidence in himself. The reason for
this is quickly apparent. The first witness almost always is subjected to the most exhaustive cross examination. He is taken back
and forth through every phase of the transaction, he is asked to
fix directions, estimate speed, identify structures, describe weather
conditions and many other details. No other witness usually gets
such a thorough working over, save possibly the plaintiff, if the
first witness is not he. Remember too, that such a witness is not
always the best educated. There are other reasons why this first
witness should be your best one. Remember that your jury is now
getting its first impression, and it is, at this stage, curious and
alert and it will listen closely to the statements made and derive
a good, overall opinion of the case with this first testimony. Another thing which should not be overlooked, is that, if your first
witness is adequately acquainted with all of the facts, the defense
attorney is forced to tip off or reval his line of defense by his
cross examination, thus warning you and giving you a chance to
anticipate and forestall the re-emphasis of extensive cross examination on all subsequent witnesses by limiting your direct examination on successive witnesses to matters not so painful to your
case.
Calling the opposing party for cross examination under the
rules can result in a fiasco, unless done properly. It is almost
unbelievable the- number of lawyers who, when the jury is settled
in their seats, will grandiloquently arise and shout, "I call the
defendant for cross examination under the statute." Consider the
effect for just a moment. Your jury is fresh and alert and ready
to give you its best attention. The defendant gets on the stand.
He is the best prepared of all the opposing witnesses. He is violently antagonistic and will do his best to give you a bad time on
your cross examination. If he is at all clever he is apt to give
the jury a bad impression of both you and your case and, at best,
the jury is left with an ejaculatory story which probably leaves
it completely confused about the issues toward which you were
driving, and somewhat bored with the whole thing. How much
WHEN
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better it is to call the opposing party for cross examination after
your entire case is thoroughly imprinted on the minds of the jury.
They can then see and understand the discrepancies which you are
trying to point out. Bringing the defendant's cross examination
in this fashion also has a tendency to take a great deal of the sting
out of the defense, because here the opposing party's testimony
is sandwiched in between a great weight of testimony favorable
to you.
It might be well to inject a word of warning here that you
can do a great deal better job of cross examining an opposing
party and will be a great deal safer if you have already taken his
deposition or at least a statement from him. A word here on the
use of depositions in trial might not be amiss. If the witnesses
or opposing party's answers are substantially the same as given
in the deposition, don't make the mistake of referring them to
the deposition and saying "Did you, or did you not make such an
answer to such and such a question on such and such a date," as
you are only emphasizing the veracity of the witness and bringing
home to the jury the fact that the answer is probably true.
It may be necessary to call the opposing party for cross examination in order to prove some essential element of your case,
but even if this be so it is usually not necessary to call him first.
It is usually advisable where possible to sandwich your "short"
witnesses between those who might be termed "transaction" witnesses, as this tends to prolong the jury's interest in the main
story, and if your case is several days long it is a good idea to
keep them for "spares" of which more later.
DON'T OVER TRY THE CASE
Extended repetitious testimony only tires the jury and many
minor contradictions may develop which some juryman will pick
out and which will be the subject of a good deal of discussion or
possibly dissention in the juryroom. You will know from your
pre-trial conference the number of witnesses expected to be called
by the other side and, therefore, will not run the risk of being
outnumbered.
Don't call a witness if you think his testimony can not be
finished that day. Use a spare. A moment's thought will show the
reason for this. The jury leaves the courtroom for the day with
the impression created by the testimony of the last witness, and
if cross examination has created some disturbing effect which you
don't have the opportunity to clarify by re-direct before adjournment then the jury wonders why on earth you ever called the
witness in the first place. By morning their recollection of the
distinct point will probably be hazy, but their general impression
will be a bad one. Frequently a smart cross-examiner will purposely stall at the end of a day, if he has been able to create a bad
taste in the jury's mouth, to keep you from re-direct. examination.
Sometimes he will also stall his cross examination to take advan-
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tage of the evening recess to prepare further cross examination
or to check up on factual material with which to further attack
the witness. Thus, if you see that your time is growing short,
rather than put on a "transaction" witness, use one of the "short,
spare" witnesses which you have saved for this purpose.
No one agrees as to where the plaintiff's testimony should
be used. Some excellent trial lawyers use it at the beginning of
the case, some further on down the line and some like to conclude
with the plaintiff's testimony. Obviously if your plaintiff is the
only one who knows most of the transaction it will probably be
necessary to call him as a beginning witness in order to present
your case in natural and chronological sequence. If it is possible
to use a strong witness other than the plaintiff as an initial witness, it would seem much better to do so, thus giving the jury
the impression that it is hearing a less prejudiced presentation of
all of the facts of the case.
FINISH YOUR CASE ON A HIGH NOTE

Many cases require several distinct lines of evidence, such
as for example a personal injury accident, wherein you must prove
liability, injuries and damages. Chronologically the liability must
be proven first and so on down the line. Witnesses who helped the
injured party, physicians and nurses who treated him (hospital
records sometimes are helpful), the operating surgeon and an
expert testifying as to permanent disability may be good as last
witnesses for you to use if they are good witnesses. Here let me
emphasize that you should get top flight men in any line if you
can afford them. One orthopedist with a well-known reputation
and fine background will be worth several general practitioners,
who are not specialists, in impressing the jury. If a construction
problem is at issue, get a good contractor who is well-known and
has a wide experience in his field. This rule, however, like most,
has some exceptions. If a personal injury case is being tried in
a small town, the testimony of the physician who attended the
birth of most of the members of the jury and nursed them through
their childhood ills will stand up against the testimony of the most
highly specialized medical adviser.
There were some specific points on which some discussion
seems desirable. They will be discussed briefly as follows:
Stipulations between counsel as to facts should, in the writer's
opinion be presented early in the trial, but be sure to read them
to the jury. After all they do not become part of the record unless
they are read into it, and they do have a tendency to carry considerable weight with the jury. In the heat of trial it is very easy
to overlook these stipulations. Stipulations as to ordinances which
are admissible are usually taken up at the pre-trial conference.
They should be presented as your best judgment dictates, but
again, read them to the jury. They should also be incorporated in
the instructions. That way the jury gets them twice.
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Depositions and their use have been discussed elsewhere in
this series of articles, but some re-emphasis may be of help. First,
don't use small variances, if they are inconsequential, in your
effort to impeach. It makes you appear petty and has the effect
of impressing the jury with the fact that these slight errors are
only human, but that in the main the witness has related essentially
the same story as he did some months before.
Where your witnesses are unavailable and it is absolutely
necessary to use his deposition to get his testimony before the jury
ask the court to rule on objections which have been made or are
expected, out of the presence of the jury, so that the reading of
the deposition to the jury will not be interrrupted by the recorded
objections of counsel. If the deposition is read by one attorney
only, read it slowly trying to be as fair as you can so as not to
unduly emphasize testimony favorable to you. If you have cocounsel it is common practice to request the court's permission to
let one lawyer take the stand to read the answers to the questions
put by the other counsel. Again let us emphasize the jury gets
from the testimony only that which is presented to it clearly and
forcefully.
WRITTEN EVIDENCE

The presentation of written evidence sometimes presents problems. If it is evidence going directly to establish a claim or defense, presentation of it will depend upon when the proof is made
as to its competency or relevency and its logical place in the
chronology of events. If it is collateral to the main issues, as an
impeaching statement, the particular circumstances will determine
the time of its presentation. Technically, impeaching statements
are admissible only as part of the evidence of the party by whom
impeachment is attempted. The court can, however, in its discretion permit the introduction of such evidence during cross
examination, and usually the courts will do this. However, if the
court will not allow its introduction on cross examination don't forget to introduce it on direct, and don't minimize its importance by
playing it down, or introducing it casually. Give it an important
spot in your case and read it slowly, carefully and forcefully to
the jury.
Questions put by jurymen of witnesses are sometimes extremely embarassing. You feel you cannot object to the questions
for fear of antagonizing the jury. Probably the best way to handle
this situation is to ask the court quietly to reserve your right to
object subsequently to either the questions or answers out of the
presence of the jury.
So much could be written on the subject of preparation of
witnesses and their examination on both direct and cross examination that one hardly knows where to start. Here are a few suggestions, however. Prepare your witnesses with a general warning.
Explain to them that the opposing counsel may possibly attempt
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to get them to lose their tempers on the stand. Tell them to make
their answers concise and direct and not to argue with counsel
on either side. It is well to warn them not to be "smarty" in
answering questions even if the attitude of opposing counsel is disagreeable. Warn them that if an objections is made they should
stop talking immediately and wait until the court has ruled on
the matter. A suggestion that they dress quietly is sometimes in
order. Your own attitude toward a witness whom you are examining will, of course, be dictated somewhat by the type of witness you are working on, but in general it certainly pays to be
courteous.
Many lawyers, in preparing for trial, prepare a full list of
questions to ask each witness to bring out his case. This seems to
be extremely good practice, particularly if you have not had much
trial experience, or do not get into courts very often. The reasons
therefor seem obvious. In the first place it gives you a chance to
prepare questions which are not subject to objection ahd which
will bring out the story in the most concise manner and best
chronological order. Many times we have all seen examiners so
upset by sharp objections that they will forget to go back to the
same place and continue the line of questioning, thus omitting
important factual testimony. If you have the list before you, you
simply go back to the place where you stopped and continue from
there. Your questions should be simple, concise and certain, not
ambiguous or misleading and, by all means, stay away from legalisms or highly technical phraseology of any kind. This does not
impress the jury and serves only to confuse and to embarrass the
witness. Stay away from- leading questions and such mannerisms
of speech, as "Do I understand you to say?" It is asking a good deal
of any witness to try to understand what is in a lawyer's mind.
These things are bad because they provoke objections which tend
to interrupt the continuity of the story that you are trying to
present. Of course, when you are the one doing the objecting, that
is a different story! Sometimes you may find it necessary to protect your own witness by objections. If you see that the witness
does not understand the question, or is so emotionally upset as
not to be able to give a correct answer, an objection and the resulting argument will sometimes give him time to collect himself and
to realize that something important is in the offing.
SURPRISE WITNESSES

One of the most disconcerting things that can happen to a
trial lawyer is to have a witness whom he thought was entirely
friendly and helpful to his side of the case, suddenly get on the
stand, bare his teeth, and go completely over to the other side.
In such a case you may allege surprise and ask the court's permission to cross examine the witness and ask him leading questions. -Such a request is usually granted by the Court and under
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cross-examination you may uncover the reason for the switch,
which will do much to obliterate the harm done.
Your own attitude toward the court is one of the most important things for a lawyer to learn early and to keep in mind.
Addressing remarks to opposing counsel is something that we
should avoid as much as possible, but in the heat of a trial all of us
are guilty of doing it. However, whenever -you address remarks to
the court, it should be done in a courteous manner. If you feel that
the judge has not thoroughly understood the proposition presented
by you, don't make the mistake of blurting out "You don't understand, judge," intimating by your remark and manner that you
don't think he has sense enough to get the point. It is much better
to phrase it something like this, "I am afraid I haven't made my
position clear, your honor" and then proceed to try to pound into
his thick head your view point of the law. Sometimes the court
will cause you considerable embarrassment by attempting to take
over the examination of a witness and by asking improper questions of the witness. In order to protect your record, it is absolutely necessary that you make an objection to the court's question. Usually you can do this deferentially with just enough detail to protect your point. If the attitude of the court is definitely
antagonistic then you might just as well be vigorous, if you are
right, and pray to Heaven that your cases fall in some other division until the court's wrath toward you has somewhat cooled!
Many lawyers try their cases by heckling the other side, and some
are very successful in upsetting and confusing opposing counsel to
the extent that he is almost helpless. About the only way this can
be combated with good effect on both the court and jury is by
keeping your own attitude absolutely fair and courteous and not
attempting to join in the heckling in retaliation.
PICTORIAL EVIDENCE

Pictorial evidence in general is something that is sadly neglected by most plaintiff's counsel. The use of anatomical charts,
road signs, photographs and moving pictures, maps, plats and
surveys are all something that make an extremely strong impression upon the jury, and the use of all of them is perfectly proper,
if they are properly introduced. Your photographs or moving
pictures must correctly portray what they purport to represent.
If changes have occurred, then they must be explained and the
admissibility of the photograph or moving picture is in the discretion of the court. Enlargement of pictures are all right if they
are properly authenticated. In identifying these photographs of
pictures, create by your examination of the photographer the
strongest possible impression of the skill and the fairness of both
the photographer and the picture. Plats and surveys are identified
in the same manner as photographs and moving pictures, and they
must be accurate as to every detail they purport to represent. You
should carefully choose the person who is to make such plat or
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survey so that he will have no interest whatever in the case. The
best practice is probably to get somebody out of the City Engineer's
Office or a County Surveyor, or someone who has some standing
in the community in which the case is being tried.
Police reports are held ordinarily not of such an official character to be admissible. Get the policeman to testify and let him
refresh his memory from his report. If, however, the report is
contradictory to his testimony, you may then use his report for
impeachment purposes.
Hospital records are all right if they are authenticated, but
sometimes this is an almost monumental test requiring the calling
of diagnosing physicians, nurses who have taken down the doctor's
statements, a recording agent and a record room custodian. It is
much better if you can get a pre-trial stipulation that the records
are admissible as such and then read them to the jury. Opposing
counsel may put you to formal proof of city ordinances and then it
is necessary to call the Clerk with the official records of the ordinances to testify in regard thereto. Here again it is wise to get a
trial stipulation that such ordinances as are applicable shall be
admissible, and this can usually be done without too much difficulty.
Receipted repair bills are evidence of the payment of such bill,
but they are not evidence of the reasonableness of the charge, and
unless counsel will agree on their admission, it is usually necessary
to call someone who is expert in that line of work to testify as to
their reasonableness. If they are not paid, of course, reasonableness must be proven.
With regard to expert witnesses, as stated above get the best
specialist in the particular field in which you want him to testify.
It is embarrassing and does a great deal of harm to your case if
your expert, on cross examination, proves to be someone with no
specialized knowledge of the events of which he is testifying.
This, of course, is subject to the exception stated above. Never
neglect to properly qualify your expert by going through all of
his educational and practical achievements in order that the jury
may be fully impressed with the quality of the opinions which he
will give. It is a common trick of experienced practitioners to
admit the qualifications of known experts to attempt to avoid the
detailing thereof before the jury, and the unwary and inexperienced practitioner falls into this trap. In such case the jury gets
no knowledge of the qualifications of the expert and thereby you
lose much of the strength of his testimony.

ERRATA
In the October, 1951 issue of Dicta, the citation on page 378,
line 10, should read "4 Federal Rules Decisions, page 374" and
the footnote on page 382 should read "1 F.R.D. 411".
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THE DEFENDANT IS READY
By KENNETH M. WORMWOOD

of the Denver Bar

Previous articles have discussed how to prepare for trial, the
taking of depositions, the selection of the jury and the putting on
of the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff has rested and counsel for
the defendant now is ready to proceed with the defense. The
various articles have been based upon the assumption that the
case at hand is a damage suit arising out of an automobile accident.
Proceeding with that assumption, we assume that we may then
proceed still further and say that counsel for the defense is not
only representing the defendant of record, but is also representing
an insurance company.
In one of the previous articles it was stated that unless you
won at least 50% of your trials you were not a very good attorney.
We cannot agree with that statement, particularly if you are
counsel for the defense, and there is an insurance company involved. We must be practical in these matters. One of the articles
has indicated that it isn't right or proper for counsel for the plaintiff to ask each and every juror if they are stockholders, policy
holders, or employees of some particular insurance company; that
the proper way is to simply ask a general question of the entire
jury panel, and even then not mention the insurance company
involved.
We attorneys for the insurance companies wish that that was
the law, but it is not. Our Colorado Supreme Court has held that
not only is it proper to ask the "insurance question" as to an individual company of the jury panel generally, but such question
may be asked each and every juror. As long as you are representing a plaintiff, I think you not only have a right to, but should
ask that question of every juror. I appreciate that my insurance
defense colleagues will rise up in arms against such a statement,
but as stated, we must be practical in these matters and if the
Supreme Court says you can ask such a question, then you should
do so. We of the insurance counsel will have to make the best of it.
It has always been my feeling that the plaintiff and plaintiff's
counsel have a great advantage in a law suit. First impressions
count a great deal and the plaintiff has that advantage. Plaintiff's
attorney gets the first chance at the jury on the voir dire examination, again in the opening statement, and still again in putting
on the evidence and then, of course, when it comes to final argument plaintiff's attorney not only opens the argument, but closes
same. It will thus be seen that the defendant is the center of the
sandwich-should we say the bologna.
The plaintif has put on his case in detail. Plaintiff has been
building up a case. The defendant, in turn, will then try to tear
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it down. It is my opinion that the defense should pick out the
important points of the case it wants to -stress, and stress those
points overlooking as much as possible the minor details and the
immaterial points. In other words, the defense should be short
and concise.
As the articles prior to this time have had to do primarily with
the plaintiff's case, there are a few thoughts I would like to convey
to you regarding the action of the defense during the time the
plaintiff's case is being! presented to the jury. In th'e first place,
there usually are several witnesses- such as the police officers, who
are really disinterested witnesses, and might be called by either
the plaintiff or the defendant. A smart plaintiff's attorney generally calls these witnesses as his witnesses trying to impress the
jury with how many witnessds the plaintiff has. In the opening
statement to the jury it is desirable fox- defense counsel to advise
the jury regarding this situation, and point out to them that the
mere fact that the plaintiff called these witnesses does, not make
them "plaintiff's witnesses."
Many plaintiff's attorneys call the defendant for cross examination, under the statute. I am always delighted when'this occurs.
If my client cannot tell a straight forward story under cross examination, then he doesn't deserve to win. In preparing for trial
defense counsel'should always be sure'that the defendant is ready
and prepared to testify if called by the plaintiff..
LIMIT QBJECTIONS
During, the presentation of plaintiff's case, defene., counsel
should be careful not to over object. In other words, don't object
to questions propounded by plaintiff's counsel unlesA, first, you
feel that the answer is going to be detrimental to your client and,
second, unless you are reasonably sure that your objection is good.
Continual objections by defense counsel leads the jury to believe
defendant is guilty and is trying to keep the plaintiff -from showing same by the evidence.
Cross examination by defense counsel should be given most
careful consideration. While it is true, as stated by one of the
other speakers, that most cases are won on direct testimony, still
cross examination is probably the greatest weapon the defendant
has. It has been my practice to make my cross examination as
brief as possible and to only cross examine on those points which
in my opinion are the vital points of the case. In other words, be
careful not to, by cross examination, have the witness repeat plaintiff's theory of the case over and over again. The defense has certain points it wants.to bring out and those are the only points that
the cross examination should be upon.
You have heard the oft repeated stateinent that thebbest rule
to follow in cross examination- is not to ask any question the
answer of which you do not know. That is a fairly.g0ood rule to
follow.
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Another thought regarding cross examination is the use of
statements or depositions. We believe that you gentlemen who have
had cases against our office realize it is a paramount rule of Wolvington and Wormwood that we take the deposition of opposing
parties prior to trial. The purpose of this is two fold. First, you
have the plaintiff tied down to a sworn statement and, second, you
know just what plaintiff's case is all about and know whether you
should proceed with trial or attempt to settle the case.
If you have proceeded to trial and the plaintiff then attempts
to change his story you can use the deposition to great advantage.
I recently tried a case in which the plaintiff, at the time of trial,
changed her story. I then had her deposition marked as an exhibit,
cross examined her on same and had the deposition introduced into
evidence. The jury returned verdict for the defendant and the
Supreme Court, in affirming the jury's verdict, pointed out that
plaintiff's story at the time of trial was different from that given in
the deposition and it was for the jury to determine at which time
the plaintiff was telling the truth.
MOTIONS To DISMISS

We now come to the point in the case where the plaintiff has
rested and the defense starts into action. The first question to be
determined is whether or not you should make a motion for Judgment of Dismissal, as authorized by Rule 41, or a Motion for
Directed Verdict, as authorized by Rule 50. I appreciate that many
attorneys make such a motion as a matter of course, even though
they know they are not entitled to same. I do not advocate such
proceeding. In the first place we are officers of the Court and i
fairness to the Court we should not make motions which we know
have no merit. Further, if you continually make such motions
when they have no merit, the Court will get to the point that it
will take such motion for granted, and will not listen to you even
when your motion is meritorious. In other words, you can cry
wolf too many times. I, therefore, say don't make motion for
either Judgment of Dismissal or Directed Verdict unless you are
reasonably sure that the motion is good. Even if the motion is good,
it may be that you will not want to make the motion for several
reasons.
First, and as I have previously stated, we must be practical
in these matters. It is my opinion that the Supreme Court looks
with disfavor upon such motions. The decisions of our Supreme
Court in the last few years lean more and more to reversing these
cases which have been decided on such motions. The Court seems
to feel that if there is any evidence at all the matter should be
submitted to the jury, consequently, if you have a good case and if
you feel that the jury is leaning your way you probably would
not want to make such a motion.
Even though you feel the motion is good and you make same,
it might be advisable to suggest to the Court that the Court with-
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hold its ruling until after the matter has been decided by a jury.
In that way, if the Court then grants your motion and sets aside
the verdict, and the Supreme Court should hold that the motion
should not have been granted, you are in a position where you have
the jury's verdict to fall back on and don't have to try the case
over again.
In setting forth the evidence for the defense it should be
borne in mind that the defense is really in three parts. First, you
have the question of liability. Second, the question of plaintiff's
damages, and third, a counterclaim. As regards a counterclaim
may I suggest that it has always been my feeling that you should
not put in a counterclaim unless you honestly feel that your client
is reasonably entitled to same. Putting in a counterclaim when
you have no grounds for same may act as a boomerang.
Your main objective in representing the defendant is to obtain a defense verdict if at all possible, provided same can be
obtained honestly and fairly. If you can't obtain defense verdict
then you want to hold down the damages as much as possible.
You may get one or two jurors who feel sympathetic toward
the defendant, and even though these jurors cannot convince the
other jurors that the verdict should be for the defendant, they
can hold down the amount of the verdict considerably.
DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE

We now come to the evidence to be produced by tlhe defense.
In putting on the evidence we must bear in mind that we don't
want to strengthen the plaintiff's case by repeating over and over
facts favorable to the plaintiff.
The purpose of defense witnesses is to stress those salient
points which the defense believes is in its favor. At the same time,
while there undoubtedly has been sympathy established for the
plaintiff, who has been injured, if possible, the defense should try
to establish some sympathy for the defendant. This, of course,
depends on the particular facts in each case.
Probably the first question to be determined, as to the evidence of the defense, is just what evidence to put on as regards
the defendant himself where the plaintiff has already called the
defendant for cross examination. Certainly, if the plaintiff's attorney has cross examined the defendant at length regarding the
facts of the accident it is inadvisable to have the defendant go
over those facts again. My thought is that it is much better to put
the defendant on the stand and have him simply repeat those
important points which are favorable to the defense.
At this time it should be stressed that the defendant is probably going to be the best witness for the defense. He is the one
that is being accused. Be sure that your defendant is familiar with
all the facts and is prepared for any contingency under cross
examination. This, of course, is a big order.
An attorney may talk to his client for hours and yet may miss
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the one question on cross examination that may decide the case.
Let me give you an example. Many of you remember James
Parriott, now deceased. Jim had been City Attorney here in
Denver and later was in private practice. We are sure that if
Jim were living he would appreciate this situation as he did after
the trial, and when we discussed it with him.
Jim was involved in an automobile accident in which he took
the right-of-way from the plaintiff, seriously injuring the plaintiff.
We were defending Jim and our first defense was, of course, contributory negligence; contributory negligence being excess speed
on the part of the plaintiff. Jim had made an excellent witness
for himself and when we were through examining him we turned
him over to opposing counsel, Frank Mannix, now deceased, with
a great deal of confidence. Jim and I had gone over the case
thoroughly and I was satisfied that he would stand up under any
type of cross examination.
Frank Mannix slowly rose to his feet, looked over at Jim and
said, "Mr. Parriott, are you familiar-with the right-of-way ordinance in Denver?" and Jim, throwing back his shoulders said
with a great deal of pride, "familiar with it, I wrote it". Mr.
Mannix.looked at the jury, smiled and said, "no further cross
examination", and indeed, no further cross examination was
needed. The verdict was for the plaintiff for a substantial amount.
POLICE OFFICERS

After the defendant has testified it then, of course, becomes
incumbent upon the defendant to produce his other witnesses.
Police officers are always valuable and particularly so if they have
not already been called by the. plaintiff.. If you can get them to
appear in uniform that is helpful, and where the plaintiff has not
called them the jury gets the impression that law and order is on
the side of the defendant.
You will, of course, have medical witnesses, and it has been
stated by one of the prior speakers, be sure to get the best. They
-won't charge you any more as expert fees than the others and
they will be most helpful in presenting your defense. You don't
have to worry about medical experts. They are used to testifying
when it comes to cross examination. You will find that these medical experts know how to handle themselves under cross examination, and when plaintiff's attorney gets up to cross examine your
medical experts you can sit back and relax.
If some of your witnesses are not available and you have taken
depositions, then of course these should be introduced in evidence.
There are various schools of thought-as. hoW7 to read these depositions, that is, whether to have someone' sit in the witness chair
and you read the question and the other party the answers, or
whethe' counsel should read both questions and answers. I, personally, like to read-the entire deposition to the jury for obvious
reasons.
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'On the other hand, if opposing counsel is reading the deposition of the witnesses I always insist upon being allowed to read
my own cross examination.
Photographs are extremely helpful to the defense as to the
plaintff. A jury can hear many words regarding the location of
an accident, or other rhatters, but a picture showing the location
speaks louder than many word.
Our Supreme Court has even
held that it is permissible to take pictures of the scene of the accident and place cars in the position that a witness claims that they
were in at a certain time, and that such pictures are admissible
in evidence.
As To DAMAGES
When it comes to the question of damages, we believe the
defense should bear in mind that the jury may disagree on the
question of liability and thereupon reach a compromise verdict
wherein they find for the plaintiff for a smaller amount than would
ordinarily be awarded. Having in mind that this may occur, the
defendant should get into evidence, if possible, testimony holding
down the damages as much as possible so that you will not be
faced with a motion by the plaintiff for a new trial on damages
alone. Our Supreme Court has held that if it appears clear that
the question of liability was first determined by the jury and that
they then came to the question of damages, and that the damages
are inadequate, a new trial on the question of damages alone will
be granted.
Our Supreme Court has further held that affidavits of the
jurors will not be admitted to impeach the verdict or to explain
the same. Consequently, you can't resist Motion for New Trial
on the question of damages alone by submitting affidavits of the
jurors that it was a compromise verdict which would mean, of
course, that if the new trial was to be granted it would be granted
on all issues. Let me assure you you have not gone through the
agonies of hell until you have had the Court grant the plaintiff a
new trial on the question of damages alone and have then had to
retry the case, at which time you sit and listen to the Trial Court
advise the jury the question of liability has been determined and
the only question for them to determine is the amount of damages.
Then the fireworks begin. We have no advice for the attorney
for defense in a situation like this except to pray for the best.
It has become a common custom, by reason of the pretrial
conference, -for defense counsel to stipulate that the medical and
hospital bills incurred by the plaintiff are reasonable and that
they may be introduced into evidence without further proof.
Defense counsel should be careful regarding this situation in that
he should be sure that the jury understands that by admitting the
bills are reasonable he has not admitted liability for the accident.
This can be taken care of at the time the stipulation is read
to the jury and, of course, can be further taken care of in argument
PRODUCE EVIDENCE
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to the jury. This may seem unimportant, but I have had two occasions when it became very important. Once after the verdict o1
the jury had been returned we discussed the case with some of
the jurors and learned to our amazement that they felt we realized
the defendant was to blame for the accident because we had stipulated as to the medical and hospital bills.
Another time, and fortunately this does not happen very often,
an attorney in his zeal to represent his client, in arguing to the
jury made a statement substantially to the effect that if the defendant didn't think he was to blame why would he agree as to
what the expenses were.
After all the defense evidence is in and the defense has rested,
the plaintiff then puts on his rebuttal. Of course the plaintiff on
rebuttal is again trying to impress the jury with what the plaintiff's side of the case is, and in my opinion the defense should not
cross examine these rebuttal witnesses unless absolutely necessary.
In other words, do not prolong the rebuttal testimony, but get it
over with as soon as possible so that the defense evidence is still
in the jury's mind.
While some of you readers are older attorneys, experienced
in trial work, many are either young attorneys or law students.
With the permission of the older attorneys I would like to close
my remarks with a few general statements to these young men.
TENSIONS OF TRIAL WORK
Some of you h~ave ne~ve

riedii a

Jur

case.

Oter

ave

onliy

tried two or three. Undoubtedly all of you are extremely nervous
as you are getting ready for the trial, and go into trial, but you
should bear in mind that your opponent is just as nervous as you
are. Just a short time ago I was trying a case against an attorney
who, in my opinion, is the outstanding jury trial attorney in Colorado. While we were waiting for the Court to convene I asked
him if he ever got nervous before a trial, to which he replied
that he was nervous right then; that irrespective of some twentyfive years of jury trials he still was always nervous when he entered
a case and often wondered why he had ever taken up the practice
of law.
In my opinion, nervousness is an attribute to a trial attorney.
When you cease being nervous over a trial your efficiency has
certainly been cut down considerably.
During the trial be sure to show attention to your client. Let
the jury know you are representing an individual and that individual has rights. Let the jury see you discussing the case with
your client. Let them know you have your client's interest at heart.
During the trial you should also remember that you are an
officer of the Court; that you should not try to deceive the Court;
that the Court and the jury are not as familiar with the case as
you are and it is your duty to let the Court and jury know just
what the facts are and what the law is.
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Many defense attorneys try the defense on the theory that they
are preparing their record for appeal. That is all right in its place,
but don't overdo it. Don't worry too much about the appeal. Remember that you are in the case primarily to win the case in the
first instance, and do everything in your power which is fair and
honest to win the case in the lower Court. Worry about the appeal
after the trial is over.
Don't be too disturbed when you lose a case. Juries are unpredictable. Some sage has stated there are two things which are
beyond understanding. The first is why a woman married the
man she did and the second why a jury returned the verdict it did.
When you do lose, be sure to congratulate your opponent. He
likes to win just as much as you do and when you win you like to
be congratulated. Unless you are man enough to congratulate
your opponent when he wins, do not expect your opponent to congratulate you when you win.
I have often told my associates that if I ever wrote a book
regarding my limited experiences in the defense of damage suits,
that I would probably have to entitle it "Sitting At The Defense
Table And Hearing The Clerk State, 'We the jury find the issues
in favor of the plaintiff' ". Regardless of that, I have had a theory
which I believe could be adopted by you young men. This theory
was the one of Tommy Hitchcock, undoubtedly the world's greatest
polo player, being "lose as if you liked it and win as if you were
accustomed to it."

WANTED!
INFORMATION concerning the activities of the so-called
"National Pure Trust Service" operating out of Denver
throughout Colorado. This organization represents that it
has a "copyrighted procedure" available (for a fee) for all
business and property owners guaranteed to avoid gift
taxes, estate and inheritance taxes, personal liability for
debts, administration of estates, wills and the probate thereof, attorneys' fees, the filing of reports with government
"snoopers", etc. If you have any information regarding this
matter please cooperate with your Committees on the Unauthorized Practice of Law and communicate at once with
either of the undersigned.
LAWRENCE A. LONG, Chairman,Denver Bar Association
WM. RANN NEWCOMB, Chairman, Colorado Bar Association
319 Chamber of Commerce Building
Denver 2, Colorado
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AN ORGANIZATION FOR PLAINTIFFS'
LIABILITY ATTORNEYS
By ALBERT ELLIS RADINSKY
of the Denver Bar

The plaintiffs' attorney, representing the injured man, by
force of circumstances and by reason of his highly experienced
opposition, has always stood singularly alone. To meet this need
the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys
(NACCA) was founded in 1946. This Organization now consists of
about 1500 lawyers specializing in workmen's compensation, railroad, admiralty and allied personal injury cases.
,By the year 1946 the number of injuries in industries had
reached 2,000,000 annually. Of this number 18,000 were killed,
103,000 suffered loss of arms, legs or vision. The need for a specialized legal group to handle these victims of industry was apparent.
The majority of these workers came under workmen's compensation acts. All 48 states now have such acts. Nevertheless
an appreciable percentage of injured persons still come under the
admiralty and maritime law, railroad law and allied personal injury law. Allied personal injury law refers to common law suits
brought when the employer fails to carry insurance, to third-party
suits, subrogation, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the like.
In short, there was and is need for persons injured in the
employer-employee relationship to obtain adequate representation,
not only before industrial accident commissions, but before the
courts. Workmen's compensation has become the largest casualty
insurance in the world, with about one billion dollars changing
hands from employers to private insurance companies, state funds,
and to self-insurance funds. It has been estimated that over
100,000 hearings are held each year in workmen's compensation
cases alone, mostly before administrative tribunals, but in about
half a dozen states they still originate before the courts. In eight
states jury trials are still possible even in workmen's compensation cases, notably, Texas, Ohio, Maryland, Oregon, Washington.
It is further estimated that the hundreds of private casualty
insurance companies throughout the country plus the self insurers
and the state funds employ about 5000 attorneys a year. Representing the employees are an estimated 2500 lawyers, of whom
about half are members of NACCA.
To keep its members, and the public generally acquainted
with current cases and events in workmen's compensation, railroad, admiralty and allied personal injury law, NACCA publishes
a Law Journal twice yearly. NACCA has recently established Lectureships at many law schools which are usually given by teaching
workmen's compensation, railroad, admiralty or allied personal injury law. The Association also assists members by preparing individual briefs on related points of law, as requested.
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WHEN IS HOMESTEAD TITLE MARKETABLE?
MILTON C. LANKTON *

When a husband alone conveys homestead property to his wife
and the wife later conveys it to a third person without the husband
joining in the conveyance, is the title marketable? Although some
Colorado attorneys do not approve titles which depend upon a conveyance of homestead property from one spouse to the other in
which the other did not join, an examination of the applicable
Colorado statute would seem to indicate little justification for this
stand. The statute provides :'
To convey or encumber a homestead, both the husband and wife must execute a conveyance of their respective interests therein. Such conveyance or encumbrance
may be one instrument in writing signed by both husband
and wife or by their separate instruments in writing,
and no special form of acknowledgment other than the
form specified by this article should be necessary ...
Both the language of the statute itself and the court decisions,
discussed hereafter, would indicate that a quitclaim deed from the
husband to the wife conveys the husband's right, title, and interest
in the homestead property, and the wife's subsequent conveyance
to a third person conveys her interest in the property. Both have
conveyed "their respective interests therein" by their "separate
instruments in writing." The 1947 amendment
to this section did
2
not change the applicable part of this statute.
Prior to the enactment of this statute the owner of homestead
property could convey by deed absolute whether his spouse joined
or not. 3 There is no Colorado authority directly in point; however,
in the case of Wise v. Thomas,4 the court said:
...the requirement is that 'both husband and wife' must
execute conveyance, failing which, as the authorities we
have reviewed make plain, a conveyance . . . executed
only by the wife, necessarily is ineffective and void.
Unless carefully analyzed, the language of the court is misleading. The conveyance of one spouse to a third person would
clearly be valid under the statute if the other spouse subsequently
executed a conveyance to the same person. In such a case the conveyance by the wife is validated by the husband's subsequent conVeyance. If the wife's conveyance were void, it could' never be
validated. It is obvious that the supreme court merely meant that
her conveyance was ineffective, or voidable, as long as the husband
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 40, § 119 (1935). This statute was adopted in 1927.
'CoLo. STAT. ANN., c. 40, § 119 (1950 Supp.).

'Wright v. Wittick, 18 Colo. 54, 31 P. 490 (1892); Drake v. Root, 2 Colo.
685 (1875).
4117 Colo. 376, 188 P. 2d 444 (1947).
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did not convey his interest. The annotation to this statute in the
1950 supplement to the Colorado Statutes is likewise misleading.
Nowhere in the annotation does it indicate that the husband in
the Wise case did not convey his interest to anyone. It must be
assumed that the language used in the Wise case was directed solely
toward consideration of the problem there presented, and it is of
little help in an attempt to solve the present problem.
AUTHORITY FROM OTHER STATES

In the absence of a Colorado case in point, decisions in other
states may be of value. Authorities in most states hold that when
homestead property is conveyed from one spouse to the other spouse,
joinder or consent is unnecessary, and decisions in those states which
declare such conveyances ineffective may be easily distinguished. An
examination of the statutes of those states reveals that our statute
is unique in that it permits the conveyance of the "respective interests" of the husband and wife to be executed by "their separate
instruments in writing." The usual requirement is that homestead
property may not be conveyed unless the conveyance is "executed
and acknowledged by both husband and wife."' The decisions in
other states construing provisions of this type clearly show this
differenceA
In Florida, a conveyance from one spouse to the other is invalid
whether the conveyance is made directly from one spouse to the
other or indirectly by a deed from both husband and wife to a third
person and an immediate conveyance is made from the third person
to the wife. 7 The Florida decisions are based on Article 10, §1,
which provides:
§ 1 . . . [The homestead] real estate shall not be
alienable without joint consent of the husband and wife,
when that relation exists.
The Florida law differs from our statute in that it requires
joint consent. However, the real basis for the Florida decisions
seems to be the fact that the benefits of the homestead "inure to
the widow and heirs" of the husband.8 When there were no children, a conveyance from the husband to the wife was declared
effectual although the wife did not join in the conveyance. 9
There are decisions under California law in which a conveyance or encumbrance from one spouse to the other was declared
ineffective to pass title. In Feirmuth v. Steigleman 10 the wife mort' CALIF. CIVIL CODE, § 1242.

6 In construing Code § 1242, the supreme court of California said that although the statute does not use the term "jointly" or "concurrently," it means
that homesteads cannot be conveyed by separate instruments separately executed by husband and wife. Hart v. Church, 126 Calif. 471, 58 P. 910 (1899).
'Fla. Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Winn, 30 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1947) ; Church
v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931) ; Norton v. Baya, 102 So. 361 (Fla. 1924).
'FLA.

CONST., Art. 10, 52.

9Rawlins v. Dade Lumber Co., 80 Fla. 398, 86 So. 334 (1920).
11130 Calif. 392, 62 P. 615 (1900).
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gaged homestead property to her husband the husband subsequently assigned the mortgage to a third person. The California
court held the mortgage from wife to husband invalid. The applicable California statute provided that the homestead of a married
person could not be encumbered or conveyed unless the instrument
of encumbrance or conveyance were "executed and acknowledged
by both husband and wife."'" Since "both husband and wife" did
not join in the mortgage, the court said the requirement of the
statute had not been fulfilled; the court went on to say that since
the husband could not convey to himself, the mortgage between
husband and wife would be void even if "both husband and wife"
had joined. An earlier California decision indicated that a deed
from husband to wife of homestead property would vest legal title
in the wife, but that the homestead
right would still be reserved
12
tothe husband for his life.
CONVEYANCE FROM ONE SPOUSE To THE OTHER

An early Iowa decision also held that a conveyance by a hus..
band to his 'wife "may have operated to vest in the wife legal title
to the property. But the property continued still to be the homestead
of the family", and a subsequent deed from the wife to a third
person was held ineffective as against the husband's right to the
homestead premises.1 3 This case may also be distinguished from
any arising under the Colorado statute, for the Iowa law denied
the validity of a conveyance by the owner of homestead property
"unless the husband and wife, if the owner is married, concur in
and sign the same joint instrument"." Ignoring the difference in
the statutory restrictions, the Iowa case is still of little weight for
subsequent decisions under the same statute -ignore the earlier
case.", In Beedy v. Finney,'6 the Iowa court upheld the validity of
a warranty deed from husband to wife of his homestead property
even though the wife did not join.
In Vermont, where a husband alone quitclaimed to a third
person his homestead property and the third person immediately
conveyed to the wife, no title passed. 7 Of course in the Vermont
case there was not a direct conveyance from husband to wife, but
the main basis for distinguishing this case lies in the fact that the
Vermont statute provides that the husband may not convey his
homestead property "unless his wife joins in the execution and
acknowledgments of such conveyance.""
The Illinois supreme court has said that conveyances of home"

:

§ 1242.
Burkett v. Burkett, 78 Calif. 310, 20 P. 715 (1889).
CALIF. CIVIL CODE,

3Spoon v. Van Fossen, 63' Iowa 494, 5 N. W. 624 (1880).
"IOWA CODE, § 1990 (1873).
5
' Beedy v. Finney, 118 Iowa 276 (1902); Harsh v. Griffith, 72 Iowa 608, 34
N. W. 441 (1887).
"Supra, n. 15.
Ellingwood v. Ellingwood, 91 Vt. 134, 99 A. 781 (1917).
sVT. P. S., § 2553 (1906); P. L. VT., § 2568 (1923).
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stead property between spouses without joinder are invalid.1" In
the leading case of Kitterlin v. Mech. Mutual Life Insurance Company,20 the husband alone conveyed his homestead property to his
wife by quitclaim deed. When the question arose whether or not
the husband had violated the provision of an insurance policy that
the property was not to be transferred without the consent of the
insurance company, the court held that there was no violation of
the restrictive provision of the insurance policy, for the deed from
husband to wife was invalid. In subsequent cases the Illinois court
followed this decision in construing the statute. In Gillam v.
Wright,2 1 title to the homestead premises was in the wife. She
alone conveyed by quitclaim deed to the husband. When the heirs
of the wife sued for partition and the heirs of the husband defended on the basis of the deed from wife to husband, the court
declared the deed invalid as failing to meet the statutory requirements of joinder.
The Illinois statute, under which these decisions were rendered,
provided that no conveyance of homestead property should be
valid unless the conveyance were "subscribed by said householder
and his or her wife or husband, if he or she have one, and acknowledged in the same manner as conveyances of real estate are
required to be acknowledged. .. ,,2 The conveyance, in Illinois,
must be "subscribed" and "acknowledged"; thus, separate conveyances such as are permitted in Colorado are prohibited. The law of
Illinois required a specific release of the homestead right, and no
waiver or release of the right of homestead
"shall bind the wife
23
unless she join in such release or waiver".
Thus, cases which have held a conveyance by one spouse to the
other without joinder to be ineffective are no authority for a situation arising under the Colorado law, for the statutes under which
such decisions were rendered called for a strict observance of the
requirement that both husband and wife must join in the same
instrument. Even were these decisions considered, it is doubtful
that they would be very persuasive. Decisions in other states,
under similar statutes, are not in accord.
MOST STATES Do NOT HAVE STRICT REQUIREMENT OF JOINDER

The better and more logical view would seem to be that
adopted by a majority of the states. In a Texas case, 24 the husband
alone conveyed homestead property to the wife and child by quit
claim deed. The wife subsequently conveyed the property by a
warranty deed to a third person without joinder. The Texas court
"Barto v. Kellog, 289 I1. 528, 124 N. E. 633 (1919); Gillan v. Wright, 246
Il. 398, 92 N. E. 906 (1910); Lininger v. Helpenstell, 229 Ill. 369, 82 N. E. 306
(1907); Kitterlin v. Mech. Mut. Ins. Co., 134 Ill. 647, 25 N. E. 772 (1890).
20 Supra, n. 19.
21 Supra, n. 19.
22

SMITH-HURD ILL. STAT. ANN.,

2'

SMITH-HURD ILL. STAT. ANN.,

'

C. 52, 54.
C. 30, § 26.

Martin v. Barnum, 286 S. W. 550 (Tex. 1926).
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held that title vested in the third person in spite of the Texas
statute requiring that no homestead be conveyed without the consent of the wife evidenced by her "joining in the conveyance, and
signing her name thereto, and by her separate acknowledgment
* . .'"-*2The reasoning of this decision is that the provision requiring joinder is applicable only in regard to conveyances to third
persons, there being no reason to demand that the wife join in a
conveyance to herself. The reasoning in the Texas case is similar
to that used in Arkansas " under a similar statute.2 7 In Kin'dlay
v. Spraker,"-'s the court quoted with approval Thompson on Homestead and Exemptions, § 473:
The policy of these statutes, which restrain the
alienation of the homestead without the wife joining in
the deed, is to protect the wife and enable her to protect
the family in the possession and enjoyment of a homestead, after one has been acquired by the husband. They
are not intended to interpose obstacles in the way of a
conveyance of the homestead to the wife, or to the wife
and children, with the consent and approval of the wife,
whatever miay be the form of such conveyance.
In a recent Oklahoma case,2 9 the husband conveyed his homestead property. to his wife without her joining. The conveyance
was declared valid even though the statute provided that no deed
of homestead property was valid unless it was "subscribed by both
husband and wife . .
I
Although the Michigan statute p-kovides that the husband's
3
is not valid unless signed by the wife, '
homestead
deed to the
where
husbandproperty
conveyed -his homestead property to his wife
without joinder, and the wife subsequently conveyed to a third
person, the court held that the conveyances were valid, stating:32
It is insisted that the deed from the husband to his
wife is void, because she did not join in the deed. The
statute does not prevent the husband from conveying his
interest in the homestead to his wife by deed. To require
a deed from herself to herself would be senseless. But
the question is settled in this state against the plaintiff's
contention.
In Missouri the husband is "debarred" from alienating home,VERON

S CIVIL SrAT., Art. 1115

(1914).

v. Stephens, 126 Ark. 159, 189 S. W. 837 (1916); Kindly v. Spraker,
72 Ark. 228, 79 S. W. 766.
§ 3901, Kirby's Digest provides: "No conveyance . . . affecting the homestead of any married man shall be of any validity . . . unless the wife joins in
the execution of such instrument and acknowledges the same."
16Polk

21

Supra, n. 26.

-'Howard v. Standard Oil & Gas Co., 169 P. 2d '737 (Okla. 1946).
1116 OKLA. STAT.'A.NN., § 4.
lConP. L. MIcH., c. 623, § 74 (1948).
"
"Lynch v. Doran, 95 Mich. 395, 54 N. W. 780 (1893).

DICTA

Nov., 1951

stead property, and any attempted conveyance is declared "null
and void" unless he and his wife jointly convey,3 3 but a conveyance
from3 4husband to wife without joinder was held valid in Hall v.
Hall.
PURPOSE OF STATUTES CONSIDERED

In the construction of any statute, the general policy upon
which it is based must be examined in order that the intent of the
legislature be given proper effect. In the present situation, a study
of the homestead statute as a whole and the decisions based on
the statute are of particular value. First, it should be noted that
homestead statutes are not in derogation of the common law and
hence are liberally construed."", The general purpose of the homestead exemption is to place the designated property
out of the reach
3
of creditors so long as it is occupied as a home. 6
This, of course, is based upon the more general policy of the
state to encourage and protect the family, the institution upon which
our very civilization is founded. In order further to protect the
family, the legislature restricted the manner in which the homestead property might be conveyed, in order that one spouse might
not be able to convey homestead property without regard to the
rights of the other. It is generally required that both release their
right in some manner before homestead property may be conveyed.
Thus, the family home is protected against creditors from without,
and treachery within. Not only is the owner protected, but also his
spouse receives protection. As long as the protection which the
statute is designed to give is exacted, the statute is serving its
purpose. Thus, when both spouses join to convey homestead property, both knowingly release their rights therein. In the same
manner, when one spouse conveys to the other, he has knowingly
released his interest. There is little point in requiring the grantee
to join in this conveyance for his or her interest is fully protected,
the purpose of the statute has been fulfilled, and no other function
remains to be served. It is a settled principle that a person cannot
be a grantee and a grantor at the same time.
Was it the purpose of the statute to prohibit a conveyance from
one spouse to the other? The requirement in some statutes that
both must join obviously was intended to be applied when the
homestead property was conveyed to a third person.3 7 Joinder
would be absurd when the conveyance is from one spouse to the
other.
Very probably, it was precisely this reasoning that led the
REV. STAT., § 608 (1929).
346 Mo. 1217, 145 S. W. 2d 752.
Barnett v. Knight, 7 Colo. 365, 3 P. 747 (1884).
Helkey v. Ashley, 113 Colo. 175, 155 P. 2d 143 (1945);
ple's Nat. Bank, 2 Colo. App. 369, 31 P. 184 (1892).
31Beedy v. Finney, supra, n. 15.

"Mo.

Woodward v. Peo-
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Illinois legislature to end the series of decisions in Illinois, insisting upon a construction of the statute clearly not intended. In
1919 an amendment was made to the statute requiring joinder
when homestead property was conveyed :...provided that where a conveyance is made by a husband to his wife, or by a wife . . . to her husband, such
conveyance shall be effectual to pass the title expressed
therein to be conveyed thereby whether the grantor in
such conveyance is joined therein by such wife or husband
as the case may be or not.
The view of the Illinois Courts prior to the enactment of the
present statute was rejected by the Supreme Court of the United
States as early as 1901. After adopting the view that when the
husband conveyed homestead property to the wife, the conveyance
was valid, even though a statute :39 provided that both husband and
wife must join by signing the instrument of conveyance, it said :-o
The contrary has been held by the Supreme Court
of Illinois in Kitterlin v. Mil. Ins. Co., but the reasoning
of the other cases we think is the better...
Fortunately, in Colorado, the statute requires only that both
husband and wife must convey their respective interests, and it
expressly permits these conveyances to be executed separately.
Thus, the problem becomes less difficult. Those few states which
felt forced to declare conveyances from husband to wife ineffective
without joinder did so because they could not bring themselves to
go beyond the literal interpretation of statutes which made joinder
an absolute necessity. Colorado may adopt the better reasoning
of the other decisions without ever departing from a literal interpretation of her statute.
In the situation confronting us, the granting spouse has conveyed his interest to the other spouse; the other spouse then conveys to a third person. Both have conveyed all the interest they
have in the premises. Even if the conveyance is a quit claim deed,
the grantor conveys all his right, title and interest. The conveyances are separate, and perhaps executed at different times, but
this is permissible under our statute. It would seem to make little
difference whether the husband or the wife is the original grantor,
for both are equally protected, and equally restricted under the
statute.
A marketable title results. The problem as to marketability
is, of course, the important one. Usually, for one reason or another, 41 it is fairly clear that the title is "safe." The problem arises
when a prospective purchaser must be convinced of this fact.
The problem also need seldom arise where the conveyance in
a SMITH-HURD ILL. STAT. A--.. C. 52, § 4; L. 1919, p. 590, § 1.
4 ARIz. REv. STAT.,

§ 226 (1887).

'Luhrs v. Hancock, 181 U. S. 567 (1901).
11Abandonment which cannot be proved is probably most common.
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question appears very far back in the chain of title. The seven year
statute of limitations in Colorado 42 is effective even where the
"color of title" relied upon is a "void" deed. Adverse possession
vests title absolutely after 18 years.
But, in the interim, it is our contention that where one spouse
has conveyed his or her homestead to the other, and the grantee
spouse later coveys to a third person, the title is marketable.

JUNIOR BAR SPONSORS STATE WIDE LEGAL AID
At a meeting held in the Broadmoor Hotel on October 27th,
the Junior Bar Section of the Colorado Bar Association gave consideration to a resolution of the Junior Bar Conference of the
American Bar Association favoring promotion and organization
of Legal Aid Societies and Lawyer Reference Plans.
In order to meet possible future thr~ats of socialization of the
legal profession, the American Bar Association and forward looking attorneys feel that complete legal services 'must,be rendered to
all members of our society regardless of, financial status, race or
creed.
The Junior Bar Section therefore adopfed as its paramount
function at the present time the promotion of such plans in communities where there is found to be a need for such. programs.
Committees were appointed by the section to study the needs of
various c mmunities throughout the state and to further consider
methods of establishing Legal Aid programs and Lawyer Reference Plans for persons of limited or modeiate means.
Representatives of the Junior Bar wi-ll later request hearings
by Local Bar Associations as the Section plans to place no programs in operation without the prior advice and approval of the
local Bar.
At this meeting the Junior Bar Section also elected John W.
Patterson of Denver, Chairman, Ben T. Delahay of Colorado
Springs, Vice-Chairman, and Thomas M. Smart of Denver, Secretary-Treasurer for the forthcoming year.

BOOK TRADERS CORNER
Attorneys Kempf & Icke of Montrose, Colorado offer for sale
volumes 1 to 72 of Corpus Juris with annotations from 1937 to
1949. Also offered are volumes 218 to 226, inclusive, of the Pacific
Reporter, Second Series.
'CCoLo. STAT. A.N ., C. 40, § 143 (1935).
Munro v. Eshe, 113 Colo. 19, 156 P. 2d 700 (1944);
Colo. 428, 107 P. 816 (1910).

Parker v. Betts, 47
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COLORADO PREFERS VESTINGLiebhardt v. Avison
GEORGE F. BARBARY*

Every now and then a decision is handed down which, at first
glance seems to strike the reader as not unusual, devoid of color,
and completely lacking in the stuff which makes intellectual pugilistics a great sport, but which upon more than cursory examination
shows all the aspects of being the perfect port in a stormy legal
predicament, or the solid peg upon which the lawyer can safely
hang his hat. Such a case is Liebhardt v. Avison decided on March
5, 1951 by the Supreme Court of Colorado.'
The problem presented to the Court was a future interest
problem and arose out of the following situation :2
(1) Louis Liebhardt wished to provide for the following relatives: Two sisters, Minnie and Laura; two nephews, Harry and
Fred; a niece, Georgia; and Georgia's son, Jack.
(2) Louis sought to do so with the following assets: Certain
one-half interest in real estate in Denver, certain shares of stock
(representing an interest in other Denver real estate), and the
incomes from both the stock and the real estate.
(3) Louis Liebhardt's attorney set up the following trust to
accomplish his client's purposes: To Minnie and Laura as trustees
and upon the death of both to Harry and the Colorado National
Bank of Denver as successors in trust.
(4) Then to fulfill his client's wishes, Louis' attorney arranged in part the following testamentary disposition:
(a) The net income of the real estate and of the stock to
Minnie and Laura, share and share alike or to the survivor of them,
for and during their natural lives.
(b) The net income of the real estate to Georgia for and during her natural life and to Jack 3 share and share alike upon the
death of Minnie and Laura . . . as hereinafter provided.
(c) The entire real estate to be turned over and conveyed to
Jack as and for his absolute property upon the death of Georgia
and when Jack shall have reached the age of 30 years.
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
- ........
Colo ......., 229 P. 2d 933.
2 The situation and the problem arose immediately out of paragraph sixteen of the will of Louis Liebhardt. Other paragraphs will be mentioned later.
I As briefly presented by the Court one might read here an estate or Interest
in Jack pur autre vie (of Georgia). However the provision from paragraph
sixteen was "The share of said net income belonging to Georgia Liebhardt
Temple shall be paid to her by said successors in trust quarter-annually. The
share of said net income belonging to Jack Liebhardt Temple shall be paid to
him by said successors in trust at the rate of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00)
per month, until he reaches the age of twenty-six (26) years, and between the
age of twenty-six (26) and thirty (30) years, the said share of said net income
shall be paid to him by said successors in trust at the rate of Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per month. The excess of said net income . . . shall be invested and held in trust for him ..
"
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(d) The net income of the real estate (to certain communities for memorial purposes) upon the death of Georgia and upon
the death of Jack without issue before being entitled to receive the
property (real estate) as provided (that is upon the death of
Georgia and the death of Jack prior to age 30).4
(e) The stock and the accumulations thereon to Harry and
Fred, share and share alike, upon the death of both Minnie and
Laura.
GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE WILL
Grouped as to assets, 5 the disposition

looks as follows: (1)
Net income of real estate-to Minnie and Laura for life, then to
Georgia for life and to Jack until he reaches the age of 30 years.
Then, if Jack shall not fulfill the requirements for receiving absolutely the real estate itself, the net income to go to charity. (2) The
real estate itself-in trust for Minnie and Laura, for Georgia and
Jack, then (unless Jack shall meet the requirements for receiving
absolutely the real estate) in trust for charity. (3)Net income of
the stock-to Minnie and Laura for life (survivorship etc.) then
trust ceases and (4) The stock itself-to Fred and Harry (no survivorship provided), share and share alike.
The trial court found 6 that Louis died in 1937, Laura died
intestate in 1941, Harry died later in 1941 and Minnie died in 1947,
also intestate. The Colorado National Bank filed its complaint in
the nature of interpleader when Harry's widow (together with
In view of the discussion later to follow this portion ought to be set forth
fully. Paragraph 16, subparagraph (b), is "Upon the death of Georgia Liebhardt Temple, and when said Jack Liebhardt Temple shall have reached the
age of thirty (30) years, then the entire undivided one-half interest . . . shall
be turned over and conveyed to said Jack Liebhardt Temple as and for his
absolute property. Upon the death of Georgia Liebhardt Temple, and upon the
death of Jack Liebhardt Temple without issue, before being entitled to receive
and before receiving said property as above provided, then the net income of
said undivided one-half interest . . . shall be distributed, and I give, devise
and bequeath the said net income as follows: One-eighth of said net income to
the City and County of Denver, Colorado, to maintain a water and field lily
garden in Washington Park. .. ."
5This writer has deliberately placed emphasis upon the assets in order to
avoid an error which he feels T. G. M. and perhaps others may have made. In
an earlier comment on. Liebhardt v. Avison in 28 Dicta 216 (1951), T. G. M.
argues at page 217 as follows: "The condition precedent which might be infered from the words 'when they reach the age of 26 years' is nullified by the
gift of income from the same property to the same persons until they reach the
age of 26 years." T. G. M. then referred to Clobberies case that if money be
given to one, to be paid at age 21 years, there, if the party dies before, it shall
go to (his) executor.
The present writer however submits that the gift of income is entirely
distinct and separate from the gift of the property (real estate) itself. It is
important to make this distinction faithfully. In this light, the "nullification"
asserted by the previous writer is not forthcoming. Moreover the specific reference to Cloberries case doe§ not support the proposition since in the reference
the concern is with only one subject matter, that is the income. In the argument there are two subject matters, the income, and the real estate itself.
6 Summarized by the court on page 934.
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the Executor under Harry's will) claimed an undivided one-half
interest in the property devised to Fred and Harry under paragraph 16 of Louis Liebhardt's will. Fred resisted.
It seems to this writer that a proper and thorough examination
of Liebhardt v. Avison may be conducted along the following lines:
(1) By a simple examination of the stage upon which
the
drama is presented.
(2) By an examination of the specific problems presented to
the Colorado court by this production.
(3) By an analysis of the direct and immediate effect of the
court's decision.
(4) By a somewhat subtle consideration of what one writer
feels are implications of the decision which may lead to certain
confusion.
THE STAGE

For some strange reason the subject "Future Interests" seems
to excite more fear than respect. This fear is justified not so much
by shades of feudal tenures and doctrines of uses as by a somewhat
unfortunate lack of certainty as to just which way a court will
lean and just what factors it will consider in that leaning on any
specific problem. Thus, it is perhaps not so much that the lawyer is
not aware that he is creating a future interest problem, as Dean
King seems to feel, 7 as it is that the attorney has not been able in
the past to determine just what the state of a particular problem
is in his jurisdiction. The average prudent lawyer (there seems
to be no reason to believe that the two adjectives necessarily require separation), is capable of examining his notes and examining
the cases and texts, and drawing a contingent remainder situation
where that is his client's desire, and of distinguishing between a
vested remainder and a vested remainder subject to divestment.
But there are other factors which place the attorney in a predicament. That predicament is or rather has been particularly acute in
Colorado. For example in Snyder v. O'Connor8 (X to 5 children;
should a child die without issue, his shares to augment the other 4
children's shares) which seems to be the perfect vested remainder
subject to divestment, is called by the Colorado court a contingent
remainder. This same treatment was given by the court to interests
which seem rather to follow the orthodox vested remainder in New
York Life Insurance Co. v.Brown 9 and in Hickey v. Costello.,0 Then
again in Burden v. Colorado National Bank 11 (X to A for life, remainder to such of the issue of A as shall survive her, if any) the
Colorado court said that this interest (which traditionally has

I See King, "Future Interests in Colorado," copyright, 1950, by Wm.C.
Brown Company, Dubuque, Iowa, at page 2.
'102 Colo. 567, 81 P. 2d 773 (1938).
S32 Colo. 365, 76 P. 799 (1904).
1080 Colo. 461, 251 P. 595 (1927).
11116 Colo. 111, 179 P. 2d 267 (1947).
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been called contingent) 12 is vested. Were this the only word on the
subject in Colorado the lawyer would be quite vexatiously placed.
However, there is authority to the effect that the Colorado courts
favor early vesting of interests. Hignett v. Sherman,13 Carmichael
v. Cole,1 4 Hazelwood v. Moore 15 and Jones v. Pueblo Savings & Trust
Co.' 6 may be cited to support the proposition. It is submitted that
this proposition deserves the attention of the attorney since it has
become the "place to stand" from which the court will consider a
close question as to whether an interest is vested or contingent.
Thus Dean King was able to criticize the court's holding in Burden
v. ColoradoNational Bank by advising that perhaps the atforney can
assure his client that the interest will be contingent if he inserts
a clause such as "it being my intention that no remainderman
hereunder shall take any vested interest unless he survives the life
tenant". 1 7 While that comment was directed specifically to the
Burden case, it might well have described the condition of contingent remainders in Colorado but for another condition surveyed by Dean King in the same chapter. Dean King summarizes
the status of vested remainders thus: "There seems to be no consistency in Colorado cases on vesting.' 8 This, then, is the stage or
the background for Liebhardt v. Avison-a lack of consistency, but
a leaning toward early vesting of interest.
"2See Casner and Leach, "Cases and Text on Property," Little, Brown and
Company, Boston, 1950, at page 354 and 355. The following is taken directly:
"(1) 'To A for life, remainder to B and his heirs if B survives A.'-contingent.
(2) 'To A for life, remainder to such children of A as shall survive A and their
heirs.'-contingent. The children to take are not ascertain until it is determined which ones survive A. (3) 'To A for life, remainder to B and his heirs,
but if B does not survive A, then to C and his heirs.' B's remainder is vested;
it is subject to a condition subsequent and is thus distinguishable from case
(1) above. Yes, the difference is only in the form of expression and doesn't
make very good sense. But the disposition of millions of dollars of property
have turned upon this type of verbal distinction and continues to do so."
See also Spitz "An Elementary Treatise on Conditional and Future Interest
in Property," Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York, 1933, Chapter II.
Thus in Festing v. Allen (12 M. & W. 279), 1843, where the devise was to
A for life, remainder to her children who shall attain 21, in default of issue
over (A is survived by 3 minor children), the Court held that the children
had contingent remainders in fee. "None of the children having attained majority when the particular estate determined by death, the remainder to them
was defeated."
But see also Astley v. Micklethwait, 15 ch. D. 59, 1880, in which the principle was criticized as applying to both legal and equitable estates limited in
remainder, when in fact it applies only to legal estates so limited.
See also footnote 22.
1375 Colo. 64, 224 P. 411 (1924).
14 83 Colo. 575, 267 P. 408
(1928).
100 Colo. 556, 59 P. 2d 248 (1937).
* 103 Colo. 455, 87 P. 2d (1939).
" King, supra, page 75.
"King, supra, page 70. Dean King pressed the comment with a criticism
of Fisher v. Minshall, 102 Colo. 154, 78 P. 2d 363 (1938), in which an interest
is called a contingent remainder, when in fact it did not seem to him to be a
remainder at all.
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The problem presented to the court was whether under the
will of Louis Liebhardt a vested remainder 19 was created in Fred
and Harry, so that upon the death of Harry that portion of the
property in controversy became a part of his estate and under his
will passed to and is vested in his widow, Avison. The court affirmed the trial court finding that the interest was vested.
Briefly summarized, the court based its position on the following propositions: (1) The rule of construction announced in
Hignett v. Sherman that, "Unless the expressed intention of the
testator clearly appears in the will to the contrary, an absolute,
rather than a qualified, a vested, rather than a contingent, interest
or estate is created." The court further referred to Carmichael v.
Cole that, "unless the expressed intention of the testatrix clearly
appears in the will to the contrary, a vested, rather than a contingent, interest is created. '20 (2) The rule that the estate vests at
the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention appears from
the will, for which proposition the court referred to the same
authorities as in the previous proposition. (3) The presumption
against joint tenancies. This came in answer to the Plaintiff in
Error's assertion that Harry and Fred took'as a class and that
Fred took all as surviving member of the class. (4) The cardinal
rule of the interpretation of wills, which is to determine the intention of the testator. Here the court found that while in the
case of Minnie and Laura he devised to them, "share and share
alike or to the survivor of them", in the case of Harry and Fred he
devised simply "share and share alike". The court noted that the
testator stopped short of providing that the survivor should take
("although it is clear from other portions of the will that he knew
how to so provide"), and called to play another rule of construction,
(5) that the use of different words in a will, applying to the same
subject matter, indicates that the testator had in view different
results. (6) The same rule of construction as in the preceding
proposition, but applied to the distinction between the manner in
which the testator provided for the deferment of vesting in Jack
but did not so provide in the case of Harry and Fred.
The court summarized its position as follows: "It thus becomes evident from a study of other paragraphs of testator's will
that he could, and did, by apt language, defer the vesting of a remainder to a time subsequent to his own death, make such vesting
dependent upon the survival of the remaindermen until such time,
"1This writer takes the position that the term "vested remainder" means
exactly what it says and does not have to be preceded by the term "indefeasible"
to distinguish it from a "vested remainder subject to defeasance." The argument will be presented under the last of the four sub-topics in this analysis.
21 To further amplify its position the Court referred to Jones v. Pueblo
Savings and Trusts Co., 103 Colo. 45, 87 P. 2d 2, 4, that "The law favors the vesting of estates especially when given to children or those standing in like relation . . . the Court will construe a vested remainder if possible." (The court
then noted that Louis left no children and that except for the two sisters Harry
and Fred were his next of kin.)
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and direct the disposition of the remainder in the event of the
death of the remaindermen prior to the time fixed for such vesting.
We can only conclude that the testator himself had fully in mind
the difference between a contingent and a vested remainder. By
the application of the rule in Williams v. Fundingsland, we must
conclude that testator did not intend to create a contingent remainder by (the paragraph under consideration) '.21
EFFECT OF THE DECISION

The writer, of course, does not propose to state what the
effect of the decision is, but rather, in the light of the Colorado
cases, to offer what he reasonably expects that effect to be. That
expectation can be simply stated. The court has reasserted its
position that, "The law prefers the vesting of estates." There is
actually no departure from the principles of the common law, since
vested remainders, contingent remainders and executory interests
were clearly preferred in that order. 22 There is, however, a degree
of certainty, in the statements of judicial policy herein, which is
now available to the Colorado lawyer in the drafting of instruments
and in the preparation for the litigation of existing instruments.
There is, of course, no assurance that tomorrow the court would
not say, "Colorado prefers contingent remainders," but to the degree within which the court operates within the framework of its
judicial precedent, it seems to this writer that Liebhardt v. Avison
very nicely gratifies the lawyer's search for consistency in this
future interest problem in Colorado. It would seem that if Hignett
v. Sherman and Liebhardt v. Avison can be relied upon, Dean
King's critical analysis will no longer be justified. It seems also
that Dean King's second suggestion (that if you do not want a
vested remainder, make provisions in no uncertain terms) has
been justified by Liebhardt v. Avison.
It is not so much the court's statement of preferential treatment of the vested remainder that concerns this writer but rather
opinion by T.G.M. who commented on
a suggestion directed to the
23
this case earlier in Dicta.
11Liebhardt v. Avison, supra, at 937.
22 See for example Moynihan, "Preliminary Survey of Real Property," West
Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1940, p. 66, "The courts have generally favored
construing doubtful language as creating a vested rather than a contingent
interest."
Moynihan compares Blanchard v. Blanchard, 1 Allen 223 (Mass., 1861),
and Bally v. Strahan, 314 Ill. 213, 145 N. E. 359 (1924), to Ryan v. Beshk, 339
Ill. 45, 170 N. E. 699, 130. In the former, "A to B for life, then to B's children,
but if any child die before B, his share to go to surviving children"-each
child had a vested remainder subject to divestment. In the latter, "A to B
for life, then to such of the children of B as survive him"-each child has a
contingent remainder. Moynihan adds, "In the latter case the remaindermen
are unascertained because of the condition precedent of survivorship." This
writer would criticize the comment, however, in the same manner and for the
same reason that he does another writer's approach. See infra paragraph 5 under
"Implication of Unorthodoxy."
21Liebhardt v. Avison: Remainders and Revisions, 28 Dicta 215, 216 (1951).
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That writer's position can perhaps be briefly stated as follows:
In arriving at the conclusion that Harry had a vested remainder,
the. court relied on rules of construction, one of which was that
where the testator created a contingent remainder in one part of
the will, but omits such limitations as to Harry, a different result
was intended. However, that writer continues, what the court in
its comparison and analysis overlooks is that the interest referred
to as a contingent remainder is really a vested remainder subject
to divestment. Thus that writer feels that "erroneous inferences
may be drawn".2 4 It seems to the present writer, however, that no
such improper analysis was present in the court's decision and
that, therefore, these implications of unorthodoxy do not exist.
The court was primarily concerned with paragraph 16 of the
will which was analyzed above. In Paragraphs 2 to 14 of the will,
testator provided other outright gifts but in most cases provided
for their lapsing and falling into the residuum if the named beneficiary be not living at the time of his death. In Paragraph 15
Louis created another trust in which he placed real estate, and
securities as a protective fund. The Colorado National Bank was
named successor trustee. Harry and Georgia were named as life
tenants as to the net income from both the real estate and the fund,
(the income from the fund not to be paid until ten years after
Leuis' death). On death of one life tenant, the incomes were to go to
survivor with remainder over after the death of the second life
tenant, to the issue of Georgia "living at the time of testator's
death" in equal shares "when they reach the age of 26 years."
Finally, "in case Georgia's issue living at the time of testator's
death, die without issue before reaching the age of twenty-six
years, and before receiving the trust property" then, the trustee
shall pay over the income to certain religious institutions.
T.G.M. TAKES DANGEROUS POSITION
T.G.M. in construing paragraph 15 claims that the remainder
was not contingent as the Colorado court asserts, but was vested
subject to divestment. Were the analysis correct, T.G.M. most
certainly would have exhibited a dangerous quandary to the dismay
of the practicing attorney. T.G.M. cites Simes for the proposition
that "where a devise is to a remainderman at the death of the life
tenant . .. the authorities declare that such words relate to the
time of enjoyment and that the remainder is vested. ' 25 The analysis is'acceptable as far as it goes, but this writer submits that the
sound principle is not intended to operate in such a grandiose manner in the face of an additional and prior requirement that the
vesting as well as the enjoyment depends on the taker's being alive
at the time of the testator's death. Thus while there is no quarrel
' T. G. M. uses the terms "erroneous inferences" and "may lead to unorthodox conclusions" synonomously throughout his criticism.
SSimes, The Law of Future Interests, (1936) Section 74, note 26, citing
among others an Iowa case, Dowd v. Scally, 174 N. W. 938 (1919).
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with the proposition that X to A for life, then to B upon the death
of A, gives B an immediate vested remainder, it certainly does not
follow that X to A for life, then to B, if B be alive at the time of testator's death comes within that rule. In this respect the court properly found the remainder in B contingent. Nor does the court
argue that the requirement that "payment (enjoyment) be postponed until B is 26 years of age" is a contingent remainder as
T.G.M. seems to find. The court, having properly found the remainder expressly contingent upon B's being alive at the testator's
death does not deny that B, having fulfilled the condition precedent,
then has a vested remainder with enjoyment postponed and also
subject to divestment if he has no issue at age 26. It does not in
the least contradict the court's holding in Clobberie's case as
T.G.M.'s fourth point seems to suggest.
T.G.M. further argues that "the identity of each remainder
was as definitely determined as if he had said Mary, James and
John, children of Georgia. ' 26 May I suggest first that he stops
short of the full explanation of a contingent remainder, implying
that only when the taker is unascertainable or indeterminable is
there a contingent remainder. The other half of the criterion, of
course, is ". . . or if the event on which it is limited to take effect
remains uncertain. '27 Moreover, following the assumption and
with a mere reference to the Restatement, T.G.M. states that "this
present identification" (?) "tends to establish that survival is not
a condition precedent." Perhaps a suggestion of the law's presonmie UUUUb
Vlll
Cl-eal,
LVu 1r1J1UUUuCA
sumpuiun as u liUlla.li aldJti
as to the "definitely determined" and "present identification". The
point can no longer be pursued without danger of embarrassment to
persons who unfortunately are serving as legal guinea-pigs.
POSSIBLE UNORTHODOX RESULTS

It is submitted that there are, however, two sound approaches
to this problem, which neither the court nor T.G.M. touched upon,
which might "lead to unorthodox results." First in Gray's old
stand-by that it stands ready to become possessory wherever and
however a preceding estate is terminated. ' 28 If the law's presumption as to man's capacity can be dissuaded here, it would seem that,
though the issue of Georgia may precede the testator in death, for
the period of time during which the issue did persist, he stands
ready to become possessory, etc. Thus, the vested remainder which
T.G.M. sought to establish might well be so to Gray. Second is
the test suggested by the Colorado court in Hignett v. Sherman
which is only slightly different from Gray's. That suggestion is that
the distinction between contingent and vested remainders has to
2828 Dicta 215, 217 (1951).
27Leach, Cases on Future Interests, (2d ed.) p. 56; New York Real Property
Law, section 40; Moynihan, supra, p. 65; Fearne, C. R. 3, 4; 1 Reeves, Real
Property 96; 1 Tiffany, Real Property, section 118.
'sGray,
Rule Against Perpetuities, section 9.
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do not with the time when the remainder becomes a present or
possessory interest, but with the time when the remainder vests in
the sense that it stands ready to become so if the immediate prior
interest now terminates. I submit that here, too, this interest might
be vested since should the emphasis be placed on the possible death
of the life tenant at any time during the life of Georgia's issue
which persists at the testator's death, he would meet the test.
The question arises: If at the time of the creation of the
interest Georgia had no issue, then the remainder would be singularly contingent. Would T.G.M. then argue that the particular
usage of the words "absolute," "without issue" and "postponed enjoyment" 29 point to a distinction between vested and contingent?
I think not. Obviously the determination as to vested or contingent
is established, as the court found, prior to the introduction of the
above mentioned defeasance considerations, by the condition precedent that the issue survive the testator. The conclusion is that
once the issue survived the testator as required, his contingent remainder is converted into a vested remainder30 (awaiting only the
termination of the life estate to become possessory), enjoyment of
which is postponed, and which is then subject to defeasance if he
has no issue on his 26th birthday.
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Several other assertions made by T.G.M. require consideration. That writer states, "It seems strange that this idea of vesting subject to divestment as opposed to absolute vesting does not
appear in the court's reasoning. It quotes the conclusions of law
of the trial court wherein the idea is twice expressed: '. . . Fred
... and Harry... each took an indefeasibly vested remainder . . .'
and '. . . Fred . . . and Harry . . . each took an indefeasibly vested
interest.' "31 This "idea" referred to is, of course, nothing more
than a rule of property law as old as the vested remainder itself;
I am sure the court has considered it. In fact the court treats the
"idea" in the only place it is applicable to the problem before it
when it surveys paragraphs 2 to 14 and notes that "in most cases
(he) provided for their lapsing and falling into the residuum in
the event the named beneficiary is not living at the time of his
death. ' 32 For that matter the "idea" has no place in a discussion
of the interest left to Harry and Fred and if used in any way but
in a non-technical sense, for purposes of placing emphasis on the
certainty of the vesting as opposed to a contingency, the trial court
was in error and the court did well to omit it. As to Fred and
Harry the words were "Upon the death of Minnie and Laura I
give all my stock . . . to Fred and Harry, share and share alike."
There is not one suggestion of a condition subsequent, a special
128 Dicta 215, 18 (1951).
"Moynihan, supra, p. 65, "A contingent remainder becomes a vested remainder if the condition precedent is fulfilled and if the i:emainderman is ascertained before termination of the preceding estate."
28 Dicta 215, 221 (1951).
12 Liebhardt v. Avison, 229 P. 2d 933, 937.

DICTA

Nov., 1951

limitation, or an executory devise; in fact there is nothing more
than a vested remainder.
Again that writer states, "Furthermore, the Brief and Argument of Defendants in Error contained this language. (1) 'We
shall now demonstrate that the language of this subparagraph (c)
is the language of immediate and absolute vesting . . .' and (2)
'... unless the expressed intention of the testator clearly appears
in the will to the contrary, an absolute, rather than a qualified, a
vested rather than a contingent interest or estate is created'." 33
The present writer submits, however, that such emphasis is clearly
outside the context of the particular usage and without justification. As to the first quotation, the full paragraph appears on page
11 of the Defendant in Error's Brief and followed this statement:
"Subparagraph (c) contains no provision for deferment of vesting
as does subparagraph (b)." The full paragraph continued the
argument thus: "We think that in each instance .the testator's intention is perfectly clear, but our primary concern is with subparagraph (c), and we shall now demonstrate that the language
of the subparagraph is the language of immediate and absolute
vesting at the moment of testator's death, and the fact that Harry
Liebhardt died before Minnie Liebhardt, the surviving life tenant,
had and
could have no effect upon Harry Liebhardt's vested in34
terest."
DISTINCTION CRITICIZED

Rea- i the context- t.-en, it appears that the first assertion was not well taken, since the attorney clearly uses the word
"absolute" to emphasize the distinction he asserts between contingent and vested. As to the second quotation, this writer regrets
that he was unable to discover this in the direct argument of the
attorney. But nevertheless the statement itself contains the destruction of the proposition for which it was cited. There the term
"absolute" is specifically declared to be contrasted to the term
'contingent", and synomously compared with the term "vested".
This writer notes that the Colorado court in one of the cases cited
by the attorney is "loose" in the same sense as to the word "absolute", and suggests that the attorney was clearly following judicial
precedent in comparing the vested with the contingent remainder.
This citation was from Hignett v. Sherman and appears on page
13 of the Brief as follows: "... an absolute rather than a qualified,
a vested rather than a contingent interest or estate is created."
The attorney on the very next page wisely quotes from Carmichael
v. Cole in which the court cited Hignett v. Sherman this way . ..
"Unless the expressed intention of the testatrix clearly appears in
the will to the contrary, a vested rather than a contingent interest
is created."
'328 Dicta 215, 221 (1951).
"Brief and Argunient of Defendants in Error, p. 11, Supreme Court of
Colorado No. 16328.
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This writer did find, however, ample passages from the attorney's Brief to substantiate the proposition that the problem considered was that of vested versus contingent, and that he did not
allude to vested subject to defeasance. Thus on page 18: ". . . in
subparagraph (c) there is complete absence of any provision for
deferment of vesting." Thus on page 19: ". . . only the enjoyment
was deferred." Thus on page 32: ". . at all times from and after
the death of Louis Liebhardt each of his nephews had a vested
interest which he could transfer inter vivos." Finally in the conclusion, after citing authorities the attorney states, "These words
created a vested remainder in both Harry Liebhardt and Fred
Liebhardt within all the above quoted definitions. ' 5
ANOTHER POINT DESERVES DISCUSSION

That writer quotes as follows from the opinion: "Counsel argue
that the interest which Harry ... took should be treated as a lapsed
legacy... This argument could only be applicable in the event that
Harry's . . . interest . . . was a contingent, instead of a vested remainder. It cannot apply as long as Harry ... has a vested remainder, because if it is the latter it then becomes part of his estate and
is disposed of by his will . . ." Then that writer makes the following
criticism: "From the above, erroneous inferences may be drawn;
first because it seems to be based upon the assumption that no contingent remainder can be inherited or devised (which is not the
authority) and. second because of the apparent implication that
every vested remainder goes to the heirs or devisee of the remainder," and the writer adds, "not so if it were a life estate or remainto defeasance under circumstances . . . such as Jack
der subject
3
here." 6
This writer submits that neither inference can fairly be drawn
from the Opinion. Perhaps a quoting of the full paragraph, and
a reading of that paragraph within the context of the whole case
would have prevented such assertions as above drawn. The full
paragraph is: "This argument (of counsel that Harry's legacy
lapsed) could only be applicable in the event that Harry's interest
under this paragraph was a contingent instead of a vested remainder. It cannot apply as long as Harry has a vested remainder,
because if it is then it then becomes part of his estate . . .- 37
May I suggest that the court was concerned here only. with the
problem of contingent versus vested, and that if it had been a
contingent situation, it would have been one of the specific situais the death
tions contemplated by the lapsed legacy rule 3-that
of the remainderman prior to the death of the life tenant. But this
was not the situation. May I further suggest that the court in speakSIbid,

p. 21.
28 Dicta 215, 222 (1951).
'T Liebhardt v. Avison, 29 P. 2d 933, 93'8.
"For the latest Colorado expression see Feeney v. Mahoney, 121 Colo. 599,
221 P. 2d 357 (1950), in which the Court applies the lapsed legacy doctrines
where devisee preceded the testator in death, no substitution or provision for the
contingency having been made.
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ing of "Harry's vested remainder" was not including a vested remainder subject to defeasance nor was it concerned with a vested
remainder for life. The court was concerned with, and the language
was framed around the specific use of the terms as to the present
factual situation. That was simply a vested remainder, which by
definition is not a vested remainder subject to defeasance, and
which as specifically used by the court did not involve a life estate.
One.more comment. The court referred to Section 4, Article
12, Chapter 40, Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935 as being applicable to Liebhardt v. Avison and found that a joint tenancy rather than a tenancy in common was created. In his article entitled "Reversions
and Revisions" T.G.M. demonstrates that Section 47, Article 1,
Chapter 40, Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935 specifically prohibits a construction of this Article so as to embrace last wills and testaments. The
former writer then suggests that a revision of the Article ought
to be forthcoming from the Legislature. 39 To the extent that the
former writer's comment was intended as a constructive criticism
of the Legislature and not a criticism of the means used by the court
to correct the error of Section 47, this writer finds himself in full
agreement.
The full text of Section 4, Article 1, Chapter 40, Colo. Stat.
Ann. 1935 upon which the court found a joint tenancy is as follows: "No estate in joint tenancy, in any lands, tenements, or
hereditaments, shall be held or claimed under any grant, devise or
conveyance whatsoever hereafter unless the premises therein mentioned be thereby expressly declared to pass, not in tenancy in
common, but in joint tenancy." As amended by the Session Laws
of 1939 there was added to the statute an easy means of creating
a tenancy in common, if desired, by the words "provided always
that such expressed declaration as aforesaid shall be deemed effective to create an estate in joint tenancy, whether in grant,
devise, or conveyance hereafter made..
Except for the restriction placed on Article 1 by Section 47,
the clear import is that the statute shall cover not only conveyances
and grants (see Leadville v. Coronada Min. Co. 40 "The word 'convey' is the equivalent of the word 'grant'.") but also devises. The
court early found it necessary to disregard Section 47 for in the
principal case of Estate of Kwatowski 41 the Colorado court said,
"In the absence of an affirmative declaration that the estate devised is in joint tenancy, an estate in tenancy in common will be
devised, unless it clearly and explicitly appears from the language
employed that the testator understood the nature and incidents of
the different estates and intended to create a joint tenancy." It
seems to this writer that the court is on firm ground in so construing Article 1. As has been shown, Sec. 4(a) of Article 1,
1"28 Dicta 215, 222 (1951).
4029 Colo. 17, 67 P. 289.

4194 Colo. 222, 29 P. 2d 639. See also Miller v. Buyer, 82 Colo. 474, 261 P.
659. Concerning the transfer of estates by means other than conveyances see
Patton on Titles, Ch. 10, Sec. 278 and Sec. 279.
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specifically provides for devise. Section 48 provides for recording
of wills. Section 50 provides for recording "of any such certified
will and probate ... to any real estate so devised by will." Section
41 permits fraternal orders to purchase, grant, devise, give real
estate, etc. Section 8 provides that "every estate in lands which
shall be granted, conveyed or devised . . . shall be deemed a fee
simple estate of inheritance, if a less estate be not limited by express words, or does not appear to be granted, devised or conveyed
by operation of law." Other than those sections cited the remainder
of the 51 sections of Article 1 prescribe conduct peculiar to conveyancing inter vivos, such as acknowledgments, after acquired
title, mortgages, seal, foreign deeds, and the office of the clerk in
relation thereto. Thus while it is incontestable that a strict application of Section 47 to the article would restrict the article to conveyances, at least five of the sections specifically involve wills, and
the remainder pertain to matters peculiar to conveyances inter
vivos. Therefore, until the revision suggested by T.G.M. is forthcoming, it is well that the court has recognized the inconsistency of
the Legislature's surface attempt to limit the whole article and
has judiciously chosen to disregard it. The only reasonable construction is to apply Section 47 to those sections peculiar to conveyances inter vivos, and to interpret it so as not to apply to those
specifically concerned with wills or devises.
Mr. and Mrs. Ken Elliott
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